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ABSTRACT

Public support for various media rights was examined in this study. Data were analyzed from a national probability sample of 1,508 adults, with items pertaining to media formed into three indexes: Morality, Routine Journalism, and Identification. These indexes were used as dependent variables in a multiple analysis of variance test based on the demographic variables of sex, age, education, and political orientation. Results indicated that: (1) men supported all rights significantly more than women, with greater disparity for routine journalism practices; (2) support for media rights was higher at the left side of the political spectrum than the right, especially for practices that relate to moral issues; (3) as education increased, support for rights tended to increase, with the greatest change occurring for routine journalism practices; (4) increasing age seemed to be associated with decreasing support; and (5) identification of rape victims and juveniles charged with crime received little support from any group. (Three tables and 4 figures of data are included; 27 references are attached.) (Author/RS)

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Differentiating media practices: how demographic variables relate to support for freedom of the press

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Differentiating media practices: how demographic variables relate to support for freedom of the press

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Paper presented at the AEJMC Annual Convention, Montreal, Aug. 6, 1992.

Abstract

Public support for various media rights was examined in this study. Data were analyzed from a national probability sample of 1,508 adults, with items pertaining to media formed into three indexes: Morality, Routine Journalism and Identification. These indexes were used as dependent variables in a MANOVA testing hypotheses based on the demographic variables of sex, age, education and political orientation.

Men supported all rights significantly more than women, with greater disparity for routine journalism practices. Support for media rights was higher at the left side of the political spectrum than the right, especially for practices that relate to moral issues. As education increased, support for rights tended to increase, with the greatest change occurring for routine journalism practices. Increasing age seemed to be associated with decreasing support. Identification of rape victims and juveniles charged with crime received little support from any group.

During the 1992 presidential campaign, the public has criticized the news media for offering sensational tidbits about the candidates instead of focusing on issues. Last fall, they stirred up public opinion by broadcasting the Clarence Thomas-Anita Hill sexual harassment hearings and the William Kennedy Smith rape trial. Debate over whether the press should identify rape victims was renewed when NBC and the New York Times identified Smith's accuser. And the media are continually subjected to complaints that they present much more show than substance, a criticism that may have hit a new high during coverage of the Persian Gulf War in early 1991.

The entertainment media are not immune, either. In the past few years, nudity and sexual situations on television seem to have increased, but television programs such as "thirtysomething" lost advertising revenues by portraying sexual situations. Music videos have been the targets of criticism for years as a result of their frequently violent sexual content.

Although phenomena like these sometimes serve as the impetus for studies of coverage content or public opinion, surprisingly little recent research has been done on how far the public believes media rights should go. Gallup, Roper and other polling organizations have had a field day reporting relatively superficial statistics during an ongoing event like the Persian Gulf War (Badger, 1991), but scholarly studies on the topic are few. The present study examines differences between men and women in support for various media rights and whether education, age or political orientation affects that support.

When asked about their support for media rights specifically, Americans seem to vacillate. In 1943, 63% of respondents said newspapers should be allowed to

criticize the government (Cantril, 1951), but a 1975 survey found that only 32% of respondents supported the right of newspapers to criticize police (Wilson, 1975). As if that information wasn't disconcerting enough, the American public apparently is willing to go even further. A 1990 nationwide survey (Thomas Jefferson Center, 1990) found that a surprisingly high number of respondents believe freedom of expression should not cover the media (28% opposed coverage for newspapers, 31% for network television). Moreover, 58% said the government should have the power to censor. More than half (59%) said that the government should keep sex off of television. Ironically, qualititative interviews in the Immerwahr and Doble (1982) study found that words like "dictatorship" were used to describe similar regulations.

A 1982 study that focused primarily on fairness laws found several seeming contradictions on the part of its respondents; the researchers wrote that "people have not worked through the complexities ... the shifts observed above involve respondents' attempts to reconcile two important social goals--freedom of the press and a fair, objective presentation of the news" (Immerwahr & Doble, 1982, p. 185). It seems likely, however, that the contradictions may be artifacts of the public's differentiation among media rights.

With the recent controversies discussed above, however, questions arise as to how much protection the public is willing to grant its fellow citizens and the media when they exercise various rights. For example, because Dworkin (1981), among others, has argued the inherent harm to women that accrues not only from pornography but other displays of nudity and sexual activity, it seems that women might be less supportive than men of the media's right to present depictions of nudity, sexuality and pornography, as well as the rights of individuals to purchase

or view such materials. The notion is somewhat supported by the assertion that the media frequently use stereotypic images of women as sex objects to counterbalance women's rights (Faludi, 1991); this may also serve to differentiate support for media rights between men and women. Women's groups were outraged over the coverage of the William Kennedy Smith rape trial and the press's identification of his accuser, which suggests women may be less willing than men to support the media's right to identify rape victims.

Indeed, numerous studies in the field of communication have found disparities in the attitudes of men and women toward various elements of the media. Men and women usually seem to evaluate news stories differently (Burkhart & Sigelman, 1990; Shaw, Cole, Moore, & Cole, 1981), as well as syndicated political columns (Andsager, 1990; White & Andsager, 1991) and the credibility of Army spokespersons (Brame, 1977). In these studies, for the most part, the greatest differences seem to occur because men have tended to be more extreme in their evaluations than women. But other studies have not reported a divergence between the sexes in evaluating news stories (Espitia, 1983) or student editorials (Noel & Allen, 1976). It would appear, then, that more variables are operating than simply the sex of the respondent. Nearly all of the research cited here used college students as subjects, which does not allow educational levels to function as an independent variable. Political orientation was also not reported in these studies.

Whether disparities between men and women in attitudes toward the media themselves apply to media rights as well is the question of interest here, however. That men have feelings of greater political efficacy than do women and are more likely to participate in politics is "one of the most thoroughly substantiated [findings] in political science" (Milbraith & Goel, 1977). (Although this source is

somewhat dated, a casual glance at the demographics of the U.S. Congress suggests that little has changed in the past 15 years.) Similarly, the media are often perceived by women as being dominated by men, nearly to the point of excluding women's voices (Rush, 1989). Together, these notions suggest that women, as a whole, may perceive comparatively little benefit in strongly supporting media rights.

Conflicting information has been reported for the effect of age on support for rights or civil liberties. Aging is often related to increasing conservatism (Glenn, 1974). Whether the relationship is significant or not, studies show that age is nearly always negatively correlated with support for rights. Age was a significant, negative predictor of support for civil liberties in research by Bobo and Licari (1989) and of attitudes toward laws (Danigelis & Cutler, 1991). Age was not significantly related to bases of disagreement on democratic principles in a survey conducted by Prothro and Grigg (1960). These studies tended to deal with individual rights rather than media rights, however.

Political orientation has often been tested as a predictor of support for rights or other politically related activity. In Prothro and Grigg's (1960) study on agreement and disagreement regarding democratic principles, political party did not affect the bases of disagreement. Political party, however, is not alway reflective of liberal vs. conservative orientation. Although personal freedom was rated the most important value out of 15 on Rokeach's two-value model in one study, only negligible differences were reported between liberals and conservatives (Christenson & Dunlap, 1984). On the other hand, Bobo and Licari (1989) found that political conservatism significantly, negatively affected support for civil liberties. Robinson and Kohut (1988) note that political orientation is the only demographic variable that is not relatively weak in predicting attitudes toward the media.

Research that looks specifically at support for media rights has produced unsatisfactory results because interactions, if any, among independent demographic variables have not been studied. In one article, Immerwahr and Doble (1982) reported demographics for only one complicated question from their national telephone probability survey: "A newspaper has the right to give opponents of a controversial policy such as the SALT treaty less coverage than those in favor of the treaty get" (p.180). They did not find significant differences between the sexes, but some disparity was produced at different educational levels, with a direct, positive relationship between higher education levels and disagreement with the statement. Immerwahr and Doble also found that the majority of respondents agreed that presumably unpopular views should be heard and that fairness is an essential component of freedom of the press. From 15 to 30 percent of the survey's respondents, depending on the question, rejected nearly all civil liberties.

Another influence on support for media rights may have its roots in traditional theories of the press. For example, the libertarian theory holds that the press requires no regulation, because man is an inherently moral and rational being who needs no guidance to do what is best for his society (Siebert, 1956). Others may tend to adhere to the social responsibility theory of the press, which says that people may be rational, but they are not always moral, and more often, they are too lethargic to seek out truth and do what is best (Peterson, 1956). The press's role, under the social responsibility theory, is to provide the same services as it does in libertarian theory, but to be of the greatest benefit to society, the press must be regulated so it will provide accurate, honest truths and entertainment that will uplift the taste and values of society. Which of these theories an individual prefers to believe would undoubtedly affect his or her willingness to support freedom of the

press.

The research findings discussed above, as well as observations of the public's reactions to various media practices, suggest the following research questions: Do people in certain demographic groups tend to differentiate among media practices? What interactions among demographic variables relate to differentiation among media practices?

Method

An analysis was performed on data collected through a nationwide telephone survey conducted for the American Society of Newspaper Editors in April 1990. Random-digit dialing allowed researchers to survey 1,508 adults -- 793 women and 708 men -- in 50 states, with a 30% refusal rate (Wyatt, 1991). In addition to sex, demographic information on age, education level and political orientation was gathered from the respondents. Age was treated as a categorical variable, with four categories (18-34; 35-49; 50-64; 65+). Each respondent was placed in one of three education level categories: high school graduate or less; some college or trade school; college graduate to post-graduate.

Respondents reported their political orientation as belonging in one of five categories: far left, liberal, middle of the road, conservative or far right. To avoid extremely small cell sizes in the far left and far right categories in the MANOVA, political orientation was collapsed into three categories for the present study: left (including far left and liberal respondents), moderate and right (conservative and far right).

The survey included situations in which media rights were at stake. Respondents were asked whether the media's rights should be "protected all the time," "protected under certain circumstances" or "not protected at all." The items were phrased "Do you feel the media should be protected when..." (Wyatt, 1991). Although more items on rights tangentially related to the media were included in the survey -- such as whether books should remain in school libraries despite protests -- only the variables that specifically dealt with the media were retained for this analysis.

An exploratory factor analysis was performed on 16 media rights variables to look for possible patterns in the public perception of media practices. A varimax rotation produced three factors with eigenvalues greater than 1, indicating that it was reasonable to form three indexes from the items. Index items and loadings are presented in Table 1. The first index included items dealing with moral issues: advertising obscenity, illegal products or false advertising; showing nudity, sex or drug use on television or music videos. The second index seemed to describe journalism practices the public is exposed to nearly everyday: a newspaper taking sides in an election on the editorial page; the media reporting about the sexual habits or old mistakes of public figures; advertising harmful but legal products such as alcohol or guns, or refusing to print certain ads. Identification of rape victims and juveniles charged with crime formed the third index.

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

These items were summed to form additive indexes: Morality, Routine Journalism and Identification. Reliability tests produced a coefficient *alpha* of .87 for the Morality index, an *alpha* of .74 for the Routine Journalism index and an *alpha* of .61 for the Identification index, which may be a result of the fact that only two

variables are included in it. Despite its marginal reliability, the Identification index was retained. To facilitate ease of interpretation, the three indexes were standardized to Z-scores, with means of 0 and variances of 1. This eliminated the within-subjects differences, so that any variation in the model was clearly due to the independent variables or their interactions.

Because the data were categorical, a 4 X 3 X 3 X 2 MANOVA using a repeated measures design with Type III sums of squares was then performed on the data. The repeated measures design was used to test interaction of media rights indexes with between-respondents variables. The media rights indexes served as the dependent variables. Sex, age, education and political orientation were used as independent variables. Two- and three-way interactions between each combination of independent variables were included in the model. Means were tabulated for each cell, and Tukey tests for pairwise comparisons were performed on these to test for significant differences.

Results

The findings indicate that all main effects were significant between subjects and within subjects, but surprisingly, little interaction occurred in the model.

Men were significantly more supportive of all media rights than women. The total mean score for men was .21, while the mean for women was -.19. The between-subjects difference was significant at the $p<.001$ level ($F_{1, 1281}=47.65$). Moreover, men and women indicated different levels of support for the three indexes, so the within-subjects effect was also significant ($F_{1, 2562}=7.51$; $p<.001$). The greatest disparity between men and women did not occur for the Morality index as might be expected, however; interestingly, Routine Journalism produced the widest variation in support by sex (men's mean=.24; women's mean=-.22). The least disparity was found for the Identification index (men's mean=.11; women's mean=-.09). The relationship between sex of respondent and support for media rights is illustrated in Figure 1.

FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE

Age was negatively related to the three indexes, but to varying degrees. The within-respondents effect of age was significant ($F_{6, 2562}=8.97$; $p<.001$). Support for the Morality index steadily declined across the years, with the mean for the 18- to 34-year-old group at .14 and for the over-65 years group, the mean was -.43. The oldest group was significantly less supportive of Morality than all of the younger respondents. Support for Routine Journalism peaked in the 35-49 age group (mean=.15), then decreased in older groups (for the over-65 group, the mean was -.41). Again, the over-65 group was significantly less supportive than the other three groups. Findings for the Identification index did not follow this trend,

though: The oldest age group was slightly more supportive of identifying rape victims and juvenile delinquents (mean=-.04) than the 35-49 group (mean=-.07). For this index, the 50-64 age group produced the highest mean (.15), which was significantly higher than the 35-49 group's mean. The relationships of age and the media rights variables are illustrated in Figure 2.

FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE

Education was significantly, positively related to support for all media rights (between-subjects $F_{2, 1281}=12.18$; $p<.001$). Moreover, education level was related to differentiated support within the respondents, again at the $p<.001$ level ($F_{4, 2562}=9.40$). The largest increase in support occurs for Routine Journalism. The mean for college graduates' support of Routine Journalism was .36, while mean for respondents with some college was .04 and that of high school graduates was negative (-.22). The Tukey test showed significant differences between each group mean for this index. (See Table 2.) Routine Journalism was the only index with a monotonic increase in support across education levels; the Morality index peaked in the some college group, then decreased slightly in the college graduate group. The high school group was significantly less supportive of the Morality index than the other two groups. Again, the Identification index produced a different pattern of support, receiving its greatest support from the high school graduate group (mean=.01), then remaining nearly level across the groups with more education (some college mean=-.03; college graduate mean=.005). Interestingly, Identification was the only index receiving a positive level of support from high school graduates. The relationship between education level and support for media rights is shown in Figure 3.

TABLE 2, FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE

People who on the left politically were more supportive of all media rights

than people on the right, but the Morality index produced the greatest disparity. This finding was significant (within-subjects $F_{4, 2562}$=4.64; p<.001). Of the three indexes, Morality had both the highest mean support (from the left; mean=.33) and the lowest (from the right; mean=-.14). Mean support for media rights by political orientation is shown in Table 3. People on the left were significantly more supportive of the Morality index than the other two groups. People on the right supported the Routine Journalism index more than moderates (right mean=-.01; moderate mean=-.08), but people on the left again evinced the most support (mean=.19), again significantly more than the other two groups. Identification index support decreased slightly from the left (mean=.06) to the right (mean=-.03). Support for media rights by political orientation is shown in Figure 4.

TABLE 3, FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE

Although sex and education produced an interaction such that women who had a college education were more supportive of some media rights than those in the lower groups, the relationship did not hold true for the Identification index. The women with the least education were most supportive of identifying rape victims and juveniles charged with crime (mean=-.02). Support declined in the some college group (mean=-.22), then increased slightly in the college graduate group (mean=-.13). A significant interaction between sex and education occurred as a between-respondents effect ($F_{2,1281}$=5.73; p<.01) because support for media rights increased sharply among men with more education (high school mean=-.003; college graduate mean=.46). The relationship was not as dramatic for women, who had a high school mean of -.26 and a college graduate mean of -.05. No within-respondents interaction occurred between sex and education.

The two-way, between-respondents interaction of education and political

orientation was also significant at the $p<.05$ level ($F_{4, 1281}=3.03$). For college graduates on the left politically, mean support for all media rights was .66 higher than that of high school graduates on the left. College graduates on the right had a mean support for all rights that was .22 higher than that of their high school counterparts, while moderates in the same education levels produced a difference of .24. The relationships between education and support for rights were monotonic for all political orientation groups.

No within-respondents interactions occurred among the independent variables.

Discussion

Previous research has suggested that men are more supportive than women of freedom of the press (Milbrath & Goel, 1977). Certainly, the disparity between the sexes found here, especially regarding daily journalism practices, is intriguing. It is possible that women see potential harm to members of society accruing from some of the media's actions -- identifying a rape victim; showing music videos that promote drug use or deal with sexual themes; advertising guns or harmful products. (This explanation may be true for the negative relationship between age and support for freedom of expression.) Perhaps women feel more protective than men and are therefore more willing to restrict the media. That women tend to assume a peace-keeper kind of role was documented by Eagly (1978). This explanation is not satisfactory, however, because women supported practices that might tend to harm society's moral fiber more than they did routine journalism.

Women may view the media as huge, impersonal entities that are either unwilling or unable to regulate themselves for the good of society. It seems likely that older women (50 or older), who may have attended college but then married and exited the job market, see little reason to support freedom of the press because they perceive that they hold relatively no power in society. This explanation is somewhat supported by the dramatic drop in support for most media rights among the respondents aged 65 and older, who also hold little power in society.

Another possible explanation for the finding is that women perceive the media as belonging primarily to men and expressing men's points of view (Rush, 1989); maybe because they feel distanced from some benefits of the media rights, women are less interested in supporting those rights. This reasoning might explain why women are more willing to support individual freedom of expression: They think their voices are somewhat limited in the media, so they feel a need to protect their individual rights to a greater extent.

This explanation is made more plausible by the large difference between the sexes in support for routine journalism practices. Men are presented as news makers in the press much more often than women, who are all too often described in terms of their relationship to men or as victims (Butler & Paisley, 1980). Therefore, men may be more likely than women to perceive a connection to the media. By the same token, though, men are less willing to protect rights of the media to identify rape victims and juveniles charged with crime than they are to support the other practices studied here. One reason for this may be that men might believe benefits accrue to society through freedom of the press; they may fail to see any reason for identifying rape victims and juveniles. Another reason is that men may want to protect the victims and juveniles from further harm, perhaps

especially if they adhere to the notion that rape victims are somehow to blame for the crime.

This gender gap suggests that men and women may hold divergent theories on the role of the media in society. Men, who have been found to be more politically active and efficacious (Milbrath & Goel, 1977), may be more likely to view the media from a libertarian theoretical standpoint. Because of the effect of sex in this study on varying support for First Amendment rights, this notion of differing theories seems plausible. It is an idea that needs further exploration. Future research should examine the relationship between sex and support for media rights in greater detail. Independent variables other than mere demographics would undoubtedly shed more light on the subject. It seems likely that need for cognition, conformity and authoritarianism may play a role in whether an individual supports various media rights.

But recent events such as those cited at the top of this study are not debated merely from the standpoint of gender. Arguably, political orientation and education have influenced Americans' decisions to support or criticize government censorship of the Persian Gulf War and the television broadcast of the Thomas-Hill hearings. From a political standpoint, it is easy to see why politically conservative people are significantly less supportive of routine journalism rights than are their liberal counterparts. The nation has been moving to the right for more than the last decade; perhaps conservatives believe that if the media are free to speak out critically, the right will begin to lose its grip on the country. This study suggests that those in power politically are somewhat willing to restrict the rights of journalists, who may be perceived as a threat.

People on the right politically are more willing to support routine journalism

than media practices that relate to morality, such as showing nudity, sex or drug use on television. This is not particularly surprising, given that citizens' groups which threaten to boycott advertisers when they find television programs offensive frequently label themselves conservative. Because religion and political orientation are often linked, religious beliefs may play a part in this finding. Future research needs to examine the link between religious views and support for the media.

That older people are more willing to restrict the media than younger people is to be expected, especially with regard to practices that may damage morality. What is interesting, however, is the relatively high support for identifying rape victims and juveniles among respondents over 50. Older people may perceive a greater risk from juvenile crime than others; undoubtedly, they would endorse punishment for juvenile delinquents, including their identification in the media. People who are now over 50 may also be less sympathetic to rape victims than younger people, because the idea that rape is a violent rather than sexual crime has received support relatively recently.

Identification of rape victims and juveniles charged with crime received little support from any demographic group. This practice seemed to be an exception to trends in support among different age groups, as discussed above, and education levels. While increasing education seemed to relate to increasing support for other practices, people with the least education were most supportive of identification, perhaps for the same reasons older people tended to support the practice. It seems that, although other media practices may be debatable, people are dubious about the merit of identifying individuals in these situations. Perhaps some want to protect the victim from further societal harm, since many people still perceive a stigma attached to rape. On the other hand, because ethics policies usually prevent the

media from identifying rape victims and juveniles, the public may simply be unsure whether the practice is legal.

The other findings here regarding education are not particularly surprising; however, the interactions between education and political orientation may merit further investigation in future studies. These data suggest that, for whatever reason, people on the right are set in their beliefs, while people on the left move further toward the liberal end of the spectrum as they become more educated, if support for media rights can be called a "liberal" notion. As mentioned above, interactions among demographic variables are seldom reported in surveys on freedom of the press. Including them might yield a rich source of information about who will support the First Amendment -- information that becomes increasingly important as the United States places greater restrictions on the rights of its media and its citizens to express themselves.

Surprisingly, no interactions occurred among the demographic variables with regard to the media practices. Perhaps demographic variables do not interact because social psychological influences act on an individual's willingness to support rights. For example, individuals usually have some reason for considering themselves left or right politically; some aspect of the underlying belief structure that affects political orientation may have a greater effect on support for media rights than the political orientation itself. These underlying variables may interact in a subtle way that is not detected by an analysis of demographic variables alone. Future research needs to focus on psychological variables that may group people in different ways than mere demographics. An individual's notion of what the media's function in society should be may be more predictive of support than demographics.

Conclusion

Although education, age and political orientation are significant influences in determining an individual's support for various media rights, the intriguing finding in the present study is the influence of sex on that support. Women and men tend to differentiate between media rights, a finding that is not as readily explanable as the disparity among varying levels of age, education and political orientation. It is possible that men and women operate under differing theories of what the media's role in society should be and how best to accomplish that role.

Educated people seem to be more capable of recognizing the need to support all media rights because they are more willing than the less educated to support most practices, with the exception of identifying rape victims and juveniles. Whether this support is unequivocal remains unclear, however: Is there a limit as to how far even college-educated people will protect freedom of the press? The answer should be found in future research. The same questions exist with regard to political orientation, because people on the left or liberal end of the political spectrum are also more supportive of media rights than those in the middle or on the right. It seems likely that politically conservative people may be more willing to restrict the rights of others than are liberals; if the nation was moving toward the left, would the politically liberal be less supportive of freedom of expression than they are now? It is a question that may never be answered. Future research should also determine whether variables such as need for cognition or authoritarianism are related to support for various media practices.

With controversies over First Amendment rights continually popping up in

today's society and the United States's shift toward traditional conservatism, the question of how strongly Americans feel about protecting freedom of the press looms large. Perhaps more important for communications scholars is the extent to which we are willing to protect the media's right to various practices. To be sure, the larger issue of what kinds of individuals will protect the rights of the media may hold tremendous import for the future.

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Table 1. Loadings for items forming the media rights indexes.

Each item begins, "Do you feel the media should be protected when..."

	Loadings on the Morality Index
Advertising pornographic or obscene material	.733
Advertising products that are illegal	.716
Television broadcasts pictures of graphic sexual acts	.713
TVshows music videos with sexual themes	.665
Advertising products by making false or misleading claims	.661
TV shows music videos that promote drug use	.661
TV shows pictures of nude or partially clothed persons	.521

	Loadings on the Routine Journalism Index
Advertising guns for sale	.640
Refusing to run advertising for certain products	.621
Advertising products that are legal but harmful to the public, such as tobacco or liquor	.588
Newspapers or TV run graphic photographs of violent events	.557
Newspapers take sides in editorials in a campaign	.541
Journalists report the mistakes a public figure made 20 years ago	.482
Reporting about the sexual habits of public figures	.414

	Loadings on the Identification Index
Journalists report name of a juvenile charged in crime	.772
Journalists report name or identity of rape victim	.683

Table 2. Mean support for media rights by education.

Education	Morality Index	Routine Journ. Index	Identification Index
High school or less	-.07	-.22[a]	.014
Some college or trade	.07	.04[b]	-.03
College grad. or more	.06	.36[b]	.005

[a]Mean score is significantly different from the other two groups in the column at $p<.05$.
[b]Mean scores are significantly different at $p<.05$.

Table 3. Mean support for media rights by political orientation.

Political orientation	Morality Index	Routine Journ. Index	Identification Index
Left	.36*	.19*	.06
Moderate	-.02	-.08	-.00
Right	-.14	-.01	-.03

*$p<.05$ (within column)

Figure 1. Support for media rights by sex.



Figure 2. Support for media rights by age.



Figure 3. Support for media rights by education.



Figure 4. Support for media rights by political orientation.